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Abstract 
Background: Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS‑CoV) has caused several hospital outbreaks, 
including a major outbreak at King Abdulaziz Medical City, a 940‑bed tertiary‑care hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 
(August–September 2015). To learn from our experience, we described the critical care response to the outbreak.
Methods: This observational study was conducted at the Intensive Care Department which covered 5 ICUs with 
60 single‑bedded rooms. We described qualitatively and, as applicable, quantitatively the response of intensive care 
services to the outbreak. The clinical course and outcomes of healthcare workers (HCWs) who had MERS were noted.
Results: Sixty‑three MERS patients were admitted to 3 MERS‑designated ICUs during the outbreak (peak census = 27 
patients on August 25, 2015, and the last new case on September 13, 2015). Most patients had multiorgan failure. 
Eight HCWs had MERS requiring ICU admission (median stay = 28 days): Seven developed acute respiratory distress 
syndrome, four were treated with prone positioning, four needed continuous renal replacement therapy and one 
had extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. The hospital mortality of ICU MERS patients was 63.4 % (0 % for the 
HCWs). In response to the outbreak, the number of negative‑pressure rooms was increased from 14 to 38 rooms in 3 
MERS‑designated ICUs. Patients were managed with a nurse‑to‑patient ratio of 1:0.8. Infection prevention practices 
were intensified. As a surrogate, surface disinfectant and hand hygiene gel consumption increased by ~30 % and 17 
N95 masks were used per patient/day on average. Family visits were restricted to 2 h/day. Although most ICU staff 
expressed concerns about acquiring MERS, all reported to work normally. During the outbreak, 27.0 % of nurses and 
18.4 % of physicians working in the MERS‑designated ICUs reported upper respiratory symptoms, and were tested for 
MERS‑CoV. Only 2/196 (1.0 %) ICU nurses and 1/80 (1.3 %) physician tested positive, had mild disease and recovered 
fully. The total sick leave duration was 138 days for nurses and 30 days for physicians.
Conclusions: Our hospital outbreak of MERS resulted in 63 patients requiring organ support and prolonged ICU 
stay with a high mortality rate. The ICU response required careful facility and staff management and proper infection 
control and prevention practices.
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Background
The Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) corona-
virus is a recently identified virus that is closely related 
to the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV) [1], causes severe hypoxemic respiratory 
failure with multiorgan failure and frequently requires 
admission to the intensive care unit (ICU) [2, 3]. As 
of September 27, 2016, the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) reported 1806 laboratory-confirmed cases, 
including 643 related deaths [4]. The majority (~80  %) 
of MERS cases occurred in Saudi Arabia [4], where sev-
eral hospital outbreaks happened [5, 6] with 45 % of all 
cases taking place within healthcare facilities [7]. The 
outbreak in the Republic of Korea illustrated the global 
threat of this disease. It started in May 2015 and resulted 
from a case with travel history to the Arabian Peninsula 
[4]. Human-to-human transmission occurred to close 
contacts [family members, other patients and healthcare 
workers (HCWs)] and led to 186 cases of MERS-CoV 
infections with 19  % fatality rate. In our hospital, King 
Abdulaziz Medical City-Riyadh, an outbreak of MERS 
disease occurred in August to September 2015 [4], led to 
significant disruption of hospital functions and resulted 
in 130 MERS cases [8] with 63 patients requiring ICU 
admission. The outbreak was attributed to crowding, 
movement of infected but undiagnosed patients and 
breaches in infection prevention and control practices 
[4]. Details of the hospital outbreak have been published 
elsewhere [8].
Most of the medical literature on MERS has focused on 
describing the characteristics and outcomes of affected 
patients. Preparedness and the response of the healthcare 
system at its different levels are crucial to contain this 
disease and manage its associated outbreaks. Neverthe-
less, little is published about how the healthcare system 
responded to the disease and hospital outbreaks. The 
objective of this study was to describe the response of the 
ICU to a hospital MERS outbreak, the associated changes 
in its workflow and the impact on its HCWs.
Methods
Setting
This study was an observational study conducted at the 
Intensive Care Department of King Abdulaziz Medical 
City, a 940-bed tertiary-care referral hospital in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, that was accredited by the Joint Commis-
sion International. The hospital had an Infection Preven-
tion and Control Department.
The Intensive Care Department covered 5 units: an 
8-bed trauma ICU (Unit A), a 21-bed medical-surgical 
intensive care unit (Unit B), a 9-bed surgical ICU (Unit 
C), an 8-bed neurologic ICU (Unit D) and a 14-bed 
stepdown unit (Unit E). The Department also provided 
coverage to boarding patients in the 15-bed Resuscitation 
Area in the Emergency Department (ED). The hospital 
had also an 8-bed Burn ICU. The ICUs were operated as 
closed units with 24-h, 7-day onsite coverage by board-
certified critical care intensivists [9]. Normally, 5 medical 
teams covered the units during the day with each team 
consisting of one intensivist consultant, one registrar/
fellow and 1–3 residents. The nurse-to-patient ratio in 
all the ICUs was mostly 1:1. One certified respiratory 
therapist covered a maximum of six ventilated patients. 
Additionally, the department had a rapid response team, 
which covered the hospital wards and was activated 
according to predefined criteria and is covered by a sixth 
separate team [10].
The department has had several ongoing quality 
improvement projects and indicators. Infection preven-
tion and control practices, such as hand hygiene and the 
ventilator care bundle, were monitored by multidiscipli-
nary ICU teams and the Infection Prevention and Con-
trol Department [11]. For intubated patients, ventilator 
care was provided by specialized respiratory therapists 
and included using closed endotracheal suctioning sys-
tems which were changed every 72 h or as clinically indi-
cated [12], changing the ventilator circuits in between 
patients or if they became soiled or damaged [12], and 
using heat and moisture exchangers which were changed 
every 7 days or when visibly soiled [12]. Due to the high 
prevalence of multidrug-resistant organisms and prior 
cases of influenza and MERS infection in the hospi-
tal, droplet precautions were applied to all ICU patients 
since February 2012 [11]. Sporadic cases of MERS cases 
have been managed in our ICU since February 2013. The 
characteristics, management and outcomes of the initial 
MERS cases managed in our unit were described previ-
ously [3]. All HCWs were required to undergo fit testing 
for the N95 respirators (Table 1).
An Infectious Disease Epidemic Plan (IDEP) was ini-
tially released in May 2014 and was revised in March 
2015. Table 1 describes selected plan elements. Accord-
ing to the IDEP, one unit (Unit A) was designated as the 
primary receiving unit for MERS patients, because of its 
geographic location being away from main hospital traf-
fic and because 7 of its 8 rooms were negative-pressure 
airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIR). The plan was 
not explicit about which units would be used if the num-
ber of cases exceeded the capacity of this unit. However, 
unit B had 4 negative-pressure rooms.
Management of MERS patients
In our hospital, MERS was suspected based on clini-
cal presentation and confirmed by laboratory testing as 
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recommended by the WHO and the Saudi Ministry of 
Health [4, 13]. In our ICU, the workup of patients hav-
ing lower respiratory tract infections was standardized 
to include bacterial gram stain and culture, MERS-CoV 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), H1N1 PCR, bacterial 
and viral multiplex PCR on respiratory samples, myco-
plasma, chlamydia and legionella serology and, if sus-
pected, tuberculosis workup. The respiratory samples 
were routinely obtained by blind deep tracheal aspirate in 
intubated patients. In the hospital biosafety level 2 labo-
ratory, MERS-CoV screening was performed by real-time 
reverse-transcription (rRT) PCR on respiratory samples 
by checking for the upstream E protein genome (Roche 
Modular Dx Coronavirus) and infection confirmation 
by detecting the open reading frame 1a genome (MERS-
CoV kit from TIB Molbiol) [14]. Laboratory workers were 
fit-tested and applied N95 respirators while handing res-
piratory samples. Positive samples were sent to the Saudi 
Ministry of Health reference laboratory for confirmation. 
Viral culture was not performed as biosafety level 3 is 
needed.
Data collection
We noted MERS cases admitted to the ICU from July 1 to 
October 21, 2015, and collected data on the clinical char-
acteristics, management and outcomes of the affected 
HCWs. We also obtained data about the rRT-PCR per-
formed for ICU patients. We identified the physicians 
and nurses who reported sick leave for respiratory ill-
nesses. As surrogate for infection control practices, we 
obtained data on the related consumables for Units A and 
B before and during the outbreak (April–September 30, 
2015). We also collected qualitatively our own observa-
tions and those of other HCWs on the ICU response dur-
ing the outbreak using interviews and open discussions.
Statistical analysis
Descriptive data were presented as means and standard 
deviations or frequencies and percentages, as appropri-
ate. The infection prevention and control consumables 
were compared in the 4  months before (April to July) 
and the 2  months during (August and September) the 
outbreak.
Table 1 Selected elements of  the Infectious Disease Epidemic Plan of  King Abdulaziz Medical City-Riyadh as  it relates 
to the intensive care (initial release in May 2014 and first revision in March 2015)
ICU intensive care unit, HCW health care worker, MERS-CoV Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
Task/description
Plan activation The plan will be activated by the Chair of the outbreak response committee based on the phase defini‑
tion
 Phase I 0–5 cases of suspected or confirmed in the hospital
 Phase II 6–30 cases of suspected or confirmed in the hospital
 Phase III >30 cases of suspected or confirmed in the hospital
MERS patient placement Phase I
 Confirmed MERS‑CoV cases requiring intubation will be assigned a negative‑pressure room and 
cohorted in one ICU
 Confirmed cases that have been diagnosed with MERS‑CoV in any ICU other than the Trauma ICU (Unit 
A), shall be transferred to the Trauma ICU (Unit A) as soon as possible.
Phase II
 All MERS‑CoV patients will be cohorted in one unit. If the number of patients exceeds its capacity, then 
other units are identified to receive the additional cases
Closure of all nonessential hospital functions Phase I
 All services run without interruptions except for certain precautions for MERS patients
Phase II
 All elective surgery shall be canceled to free more ICU beds
Phase III
 All elective cardiac surgery shall be canceled
 Outpatient clinic visits shall be limited to urgent visits only
Healthcare worker (HCW) management All HCWs shall be aware of
1. Relevant infection prevention and control policies and procedures
2. Their annual influenza immunization status. If not vaccinated, please contact the employee health 
clinic to arrange for an appointment
3. Their N95 fit check/test status. If have not been fit‑tested, please contact the employee health clinic to 
arrange for an appointment
HCWs exposed to a confirmed MERS‑CoV case shall be assessed according to a predetermined protocol
HCWs requiring isolation at home and happen to share a room with another HCW will be provided 
a room in the designated accommodation for isolation till cleared by the Infection Prevention and 
Control Department
An Infection Prevention and Control officer is available 24 h per day, 7 days per week
Page 4 of 11Al‑Dorzi et al. Ann. Intensive Care  (2016) 6:101 
Results
Description of the MERS outbreak
In July 2015, five cases of acute respiratory failure were 
referred to the ICU team from the ED and wards and 
were diagnosed to have MERS pneumonia. As the num-
ber of MERS patients increased, the IDEP was activated 
on August 2, and included strict implementation of infec-
tion control measures, including airborne and contact 
isolation for confirmed and probable MERS cases, and 
droplet and contact isolation for suspected cases [8]. On 
August 18, Phase III of the IDEP was activated (Table 1), 
which included ED closure, elective surgical procedure 
cancelation and outpatient clinic suspension [8]. Mean-
while, the ICU maintained full operations. Figure 1 shows 
the time line of MERS cases in all our units between 
July 1 and October 21, 2015. During the outbreak, we 
received a total of 63 MERS cases with the peak being on 
August 25, 2015, when the census of confirmed MERS 
cases reached 27 in the three MERS-designated ICUs. 
The last new ICU case was on September 13, 2015.
Diagnosing MERS
Suspected MERS cases had rRT-PCR on nasopharyn-
geal swabs in nonintubated patients and on deep tracheal 
aspirates in intubated patients. Fiberoptic bronchoscopy 
was not performed for the diagnostic workup of MERS or 
ventilator-associated pneumonia. Repeated testing was 
frequently needed to make the diagnosis. Among our 63 
critically ill MERS patients, the initial MERS-CoV test-
ing was performed on nasopharyngeal swabs in 29 and 
deep tracheal aspirates in the rest (n =  34). In the first 
sample, MERS-CoV was detected in only 6/29 (20.7  %) 
nasopharyngeal samples and 26/34 (76.5  %) deep tra-
cheal aspirates. After initial negative or equivocal naso-
pharyngeal swabs (n  =  23), a second nasopharyngeal 
swab was performed in 16 patients (positive in 37.5  %) 
and deep tracheal aspirate in 5 (positive in 100 %). Our 
microbiology laboratory extended its working hours and 
prioritized testing samples coming from the ICU and the 
rest of the hospital. The number of MERS-CoV tests per-
formed on ICU patients went up from an average of 1.5 
before to 5.3 per day during the outbreak with a maxi-
mum of 19 tests on September 4, 2015. In patients with 
suspected MERS and negative rRT-PCR, the test was 
repeated after 1–2  days. There was a general consensus 
among our intensivists that three negative lower respira-
tory samples and low clinical pretest probability were 
needed to exclude MERS-CoV infection. For patients 
with confirmed MERS, the test was repeated twice 








No of new MERS patients in the ICU 
Total number of MERS patients in the ICU 
Unit A Unit B Unit C Units starting to 
admit MERS patients 
Fig. 1 Time line of MERS cases in all our units between July 1 and October 21, 2015
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Characteristics, management and outcomes of MERS 
patients
The mean age of the 63 patients was 57.9 ±  18.6  years 
with the majority (69.8  %) being males. Eight hospital 
workers required ICU admission after acquiring MERS. 
Table  2 summarizes their characteristics. Half of them 
did not have direct contact with patients. One of them 
was a pregnant nurse that worked in the ED. All but one 
required intubation.
The medical management of MERS patients was largely 
supportive. Most (80.9  %) MERS patients required 
endotracheal intubation, which was performed by the 
most experienced available physician with airborne pre-
cautions. Lung-protective ventilation was implemented 
for acute respiratory distress syndrome with tidal volumes 
(4–6 ml/Kg of ideal body weight). To reduce the airborne 
generating procedures, we discouraged the use of nonin-
vasive ventilation for suspected MERS cases. Neverthe-
less, it was used in the initial management of 12 (19.0 %) 
patients. These patients were either suspected to have 
concomitant cardiogenic pulmonary edema or had milder 
disease. Intubation was needed for 10 patients. High-
flow oxygen therapy was not used as it was unavailable. 
When needed, bronchodilators were used via metered 
dose inhalers rather than nebulizers. Most (58.7 %) MERS 
patients required vasopressors. Renal replacement ther-
apy was provided for 37 (58.7 %) patients.
For the hospital workers acquiring MERS (n = 8), cisa-
tracurium infusion was used in 7 (87.5  %), early prone 
positioning in 4 (50  %), continuous renal replacement 
therapy in 4 (50  %) and extracorporeal membrane oxy-
genation in 1 (Table 2). None of the patients received rib-
avirin, interferon therapy or high-dose steroids.
The hospital mortality of MERS patients was 63.4  % 
with all deaths occurring in the ICU. All hospital workers 
who had MERS survived and were discharged to home. 
The ICU and hospital length of stay were prolonged 
(15.0 ± 17.0 and 30.6 ± 23.1 days, respectively).
The ICU outbreak management
Leadership and communication
During the outbreak, our hospital established a Com-
mand Center, which met twice daily, and oversaw all 
interventions in accordance to the IDEP. The Intensive 
Care Department chairman was a member of the Com-
mand Center and presented daily the number of sus-
pected and confirmed cases in the ICU, bed and staff 
management issues and any challenges. The Department 
chairman attended all morning handover meetings in the 
ICU where he received input from the ICU teams and 
provided feedback from the Command Center.
The hospital provided an intranet page that had educa-
tional material on MERS, MERS management guidelines 
and proper infection control practices. The page was 
regularly updated. Additionally, the hospital frequently 
informed staff about the MERS outbreak status through 
emails. Staff could communicate with the Command 
Center regarding any outbreak-related concern or ques-
tion. The Intensive Care Department communicated 
with the medical staff about the Saudi Ministry of Health 
and WHO practice guidelines. Before and during the 
outbreak, the WHO interim guidance for the manage-
ment of suspected and confirmed MERS-CoV infection 
[15] was circulated to our ICU staff. Moreover, a letter 
expressing gratitude and encouragement was sent from 
the Department Chairman to all HCWs.
Family visiting to MERS patients was restricted from 
an open visiting policy to 2 h per day during the evening 
with visitors not allowed to enter patient rooms. Visiting 
outside these hours was allowed in selected cases if the 
clinical condition required. To update the patients’ fami-
lies, the ICU consultant contacted and updated the next 
of kin by phone every day and addressed the family con-
cerns. A nurse was assigned to screen all staff and visi-
tors entering each unit by asking for symptoms of acute 
respiratory infection and measuring temperature. Staff 
and family members with symptoms of acute respiratory 
illness or fever were not allowed to enter.
Facility management
The initial MERS cases were admitted to the desig-
nated MERS unit (Unit A). As the number of patients 
increased, the ICU leadership identified other ICUs as 
potential placement units. The hospital clinical engi-
neers converted a total of 24 standard rooms in Unit B 
and Unit C to negative-pressure rooms by increasing air 
exhaust more than supply by 50 cubic feet per minute. As 
the number of suspected and confirmed MERS patients 
increased, Unit B and then Unit C were used.
Disposition of non‑MERS patients
As the number of our MERS patients increased beyond 
Unit A capacity, patients without MERS were transferred 
to other units or hospitals to increase bed capacity. The 
old pediatric ICU, which was recently vacated in June 
2015 after the opening of a new pediatric hospital, was 
used to care for stable and long-term patients. During the 
outbreak, 13 and 7 patients from Units A and B, respec-
tively, were transferred to the other ICUs (Units C-E and 
the old pediatric ICU), and 1 patient to another hospital.
Staffing
The care for MERS patients was demanding. For exam-
ple, 4 of the 8 affected HCWs required prone position-
ing for the management of acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (Table 2). Also 4 of them required continuous 
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renal replacement therapy for up to 37 days (Table 2). The 
care was also associated with significant exposure risk. 
This can be reflected in the duration of mechanical venti-
lation for the HCWs who required intubation (7–57 days) 
and length of ICU stay (7–63  days) (Table  2). During 
the outbreak, the nurse-to-patient ratio was mostly 1:1 
except for one patient on ECMO (2:1). Additionally, 1–2 
additional nurses were deployed in each unit to assist 
in procedures such as prone positioning and to moni-
tor and correct infection control practices. In unit A, 
for instance, the nurse-to-patient ratio was 1:1.2 before 
the outbreak and became 1:0.8 during the outbreak. We 
restricted medical management to the attending physi-
cians, senior registrars and critical care fellows. Rotat-
ing residents were not allowed to work in the ICU during 
the outbreak. Entry of nonclinical staff, such as research 
coordinators, was restricted and the ongoing clinical tri-
als were put on hold, except for MERS studies, to reduce 
staff exposure.
During the outbreak, concerns among ICU staff were 
raised about acquiring MERS and transmitting the virus 
to their families; a concern that was substantiated by see-
ing hospital workers infected and developing critical ill-
ness. However, many felt privileged to be part ICU team 
managing the outbreak and taking care of MERS patients; 
none refused to report to work as per schedule. Two 
pregnant ICU nurses were redeployed to low-risk units. 
Staff members who developed fever, respiratory symp-
toms or gastrointestinal illness were asked not to present 
to work, but rather to report to the ED or the Employee 
Health Clinic depending on their illness severity. Of the 
152 bedside nurses covering Units A and B, 41 (27.0 %) 
nurses had symptoms of acute respiratory infection dur-
ing the outbreak and consequently had nasopharyngeal 
swabs obtained for MERS-CoV; all tested negative. Their 
total sick leave duration was 138 days (range: 1–15 days 
per nurse). In comparison, in the 2  months before the 
outbreak, 26 (17.1 %) nurses had sick leaves for a total of 
33  days (range 1–2  days per nurse). Of the 49 nonresi-
dent ICU physicians, 9 (18.4 %) physicians received sick 
leave for a total of 30 days (range 3–4 days per physician). 
In Unit C, two nurses (1.0 %) of 196 nurses who worked 
in MERS units (Units A, B and C) and one rotating resi-
dent (1.3 %) out of 80 physicians covering the ICUs tested 
positive for MERS-CoV. The resident and one of the 
nurses were symptomatic and required hospitalization in 
a MERS ward for approximately 1 week and both recov-
ered fully.
Logistics for infection prevention and control
In February 2012, long before the MERS outbreak, 
droplet precautions had been added to the standard 
precautions for all ICU patients, mainly to prevent the 
transmission of influenza. During the outbreak, air-
borne precautions were added for all confirmed and 
suspected MERS cases. Although all staff were required 
to be fit-tested for the N95 respirators before the out-
break (Table 1), we discovered that many ICU staff were 
not tested. During the outbreak, a clinic was emer-
gently opened to fit test HCWs and the results were 
documented.
Specific policies and procedures were developed or 
updated for donning and doffing personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Related visual instructions were pro-
vided inside each ICU room. Outside patient rooms, 
carts containing PPE were organized to facilitate donning 
in the correct sequence. During the outbreak, additional 
training on hand hygiene techniques and PPE applica-
tion was provided. Housekeepers were also retrained on 
proper cleaning techniques and PPE use. The Intensive 
Care Department worked closely with the Infection Pre-
vention and Control Department on all aspects of infec-
tion control.
The implementation of such infection control measures 
required having adequate PPE supplies, such as respira-
tors, goggles, face shields and gowns. Table  3 describes 
the consumption of surface disinfectants, antiseptic alco-
hol for hand hygiene, N95 masks and other PPE before 
and during the MERS-CoV outbreak. During the out-
break, the consumption of detergent surface disinfectant 
and ethyl alcohol for alcohol-based hand rub increased by 
almost 30 % and the use of N95 masks increased by >15 
times compared to the preceding 4 months. The number 
of examination gowns per patient per day decreased dur-
ing the outbreak probably due to staff avoiding unnec-
essary exposure. Twenty-four powered air-purifying 
respirators were made available to staff who failed the 
N95 respirator fit test. They were used by 8 physicians, 7 
nurses and 14 respiratory therapists. Training sessions on 
their application were conducted.
Discussion
In this report, we described how the ICU responded to 
a MERS-CoV outbreak at a tertiary-care hospital. The 
outbreak led to 63 MERS patients requiring prolonged 
ICU care and most received invasive mechanical venti-
lation, vasopressors and renal replacement therapy. The 
overall mortality was 63 %, but all affected hospital work-
ers survived. The outbreak management included almost 
tripling the ICU capacity of negative-pressure rooms and 
intensifying infection prevention and control practices. 
Even though ICU staff had significant exposure risk, very 
small number acquired MERS-CoV.
Response to incidents such as an infectious hospital 
outbreak requires a robust hospital-wide command and 
control structure that is able to make rapid informed 
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decisions across an institution. As it was the case in 
our hospital, the control of outbreak may require major 
interventions such as closing the ED, suspending elec-
tive surgeries, preventing inter-facility patient transfers, 
canceling ambulatory clinics and outpatient diagnostic 
procedures, preventing hospital staff from working at 
other institutions and restricting hospital visitors [16]. 
Our hospital had a preexisting IDEP, which facilitated 
managing and containing the MERS-CoV outbreak. Such 
a plan is mandatory for every hospital.
MERS infection is associated with several challenges. 
Its presenting symptoms overlap with those of other 
severe acute respiratory illnesses and include fever (71 %), 
cough (68  %), dyspnea (66  %) and diarrhea (32  %) [17], 
often in older adults with preexisting chronic comorbidi-
ties [17, 18]. Common laboratory abnormalities include 
leukopenia, lymphocytopenia, thrombocytopenia and 
elevated serum creatinine, lactate dehydrogenase, and 
liver enzymes [17]. The initial chest radiographs show 
minimal abnormality to extensive bilateral infiltrates [17]. 
Unfortunately, many frontline physicians are unfamiliar 
with the MERS case definition, probably because cases 
are sporadic, leading to delayed or even missed diag-
nosis. Delayed recognition may lead to exposing many 
other patients, visitors and HCWs to the infection as it 
was the case in our hospital. MERS-CoV nosocomial 
transmission is thought to be via respiratory drop-
lets, and contact spread is suspected [19]. In Korea, the 
delayed diagnosis of an infected traveler to the Arabian 
Peninsula led to 186 MERS cases and resulted in intra- 
and inter-hospital transmission [20]. In Saudi Arabia, 
45 % of MERS cases were acquired in the healthcare set-
ting with 12  % of all cases being HCWs [7]. Therefore, 
taking a detailed history, knowing MERS case definitions, 
standardizing pneumonia workup, obtaining lower res-
piratory tract specimens [21] and implementing droplet 
isolation for suspected cases are crucial interventions to 
break the transmission chain in the healthcare setting.
Admitting MERS patients in single-bedded negative-
pressure rooms and cohorting them in selected units are 
recommended to facilitate providing care and monitor-
ing [22]. During an outbreak, clinical engineering should 
have expedient plans to convert standard rooms. Retro-
fitting the rooms with externally exhausted HEPA filters 
may be a solution [16]. Outbreaks can lead to significant 
increase in the need for ICU beds, but may simultane-
ously reduce the available beds. The SARS outbreak in 
Toronto led to 10-day closures of 35 ICU beds, which 
represented 38  % of the tertiary-care university medi-
cal-surgical ICU beds in Toronto [16]. Hence, hospitals 
should always have plans to augment ICU bed capacity, 
such as by transforming general wards. The ability of any 
Table 3 Consumption of 2 % chlorhexidine for surface disinfection, antiseptic ethyl alcohol for hand hygiene, N95 res-
piratory masks and other personal protective equipment before and during the MERS-CoV outbreak
Before the outbreak  
(4 months: April–July)
During the outbreak 
(2 months: August–September)
Detergent disinfectant (mL/ICU room/day) 23.0 34.2
Nonalcoholic surface disinfectant wipes
 Total number consumed 10,300 11,350
 Number consumed per room per day 2.9 6.4
Average volume of alcohol‑based hand rub (mL/patient/day) 120 163
N95 masks
 Total number consumed 3610 29,605
 Number consumed per patient per day 1.0 16.7
Gowns (regular nonsterile disposable)
 Total number consumed 179,100 7000
 Number consumed per patient per day 50.6 4.0
Gowns (waterproof nonsterile disposable)
 Total number consumed 1015 23,916
 Number consumed per patient per day 0.3 13.5
Eye‑protective glasses
 Total number consumed 190 10,180
 Number consumed per patient per day 0.05 5.75
Examination gloves, N
 Total number consumed 554,600 187,900
 Number consumed per patient per day 156.8 106.2
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hospital to deal with an infectious outbreak is decided by 
the availability of ICU beds [23].
Caring for MERS patients represents a substantial 
exposure risk for ICU staff because of three reasons: high 
exposure dose, long daily contact hours and prolonged 
ICU stay with viral shedding. MERS-CoV patients requir-
ing ICU admission have higher viral load than other 
MERS patients [24]. Aerosol-generating procedures, such 
as noninvasive ventilation, suctioning and bronchoscopy, 
add to the exposure and transmission risk [25]. Extended 
bedside care is needed for MERS patients due to the 
requirement of organ support such as mechanical ven-
tilation, vasopressor therapy, continuous renal replace-
ment therapy, prone positioning and extracorporeal 
membrane oxygenation [2, 3]. In this study, we observed 
an increase in the nurse-to-patient ratio from 1:1.2 to 
approximately 1:0.8 during the outbreak. The SARS epi-
demic was also associated with increases in the nurse-to-
patient ratio [26]. Stay in the ICU can last for weeks [3], 
which we observed. Additionally, MERS-CoV shedding 
can be prolonged and may last for >30 days [27].
The exposure risk to MERS-CoV can exert signifi-
cant psychosocial stress on HCWs. Death has occurred 
in young HCWs who acquired MERS-CoV infection 
[28], which adds to this fear. During the SARS out-
break in Toronto, a survey of HCWs found that >60 % 
of respondents reported SARS-related concern for 
their own or their family’s health [29]. Moreover, 29 % 
of respondents had probable emotional distress [29]. 
During our outbreak, many ICU staff expressed con-
cerns about acquiring MERS. Staff safety should be a 
primary goal in a hospital infectious outbreak. Preg-
nant and immunocompromised staff should be rede-
ployed to lower-risk areas [30], which we did. Proper 
exposure management should be pre-planned, which 
was determined in our IDEP. N95 respirator fit testing 
should be performed at hiring of new staff and done for 
all other staff before any outbreak. Although fit testing 
was required for all staff, many did not have fit testing 
done. However, in response to the outbreak, fit testing 
was performed to all staff and powered air-purifying 
respirators were provided to those who failed fit testing. 
Strict infection prevention and control practices should 
be implemented and audited. This was performed in our 
units. Repetitive training is recommended [31]. Despite 
intensive infection prevention practices, 3 of our ICU 
staff had MERS-CoV infection during the outbreak 
likely due to suboptimal PPE use while intubating yet 
undiagnosed patients.
MERS management was supportive and largely 
adhered to the WHO recommendations [15]. It included 
intubation, early prone positioning and neuromuscular 
blockade for moderate-to-severe acute respiratory dis-
tress syndrome as these interventions have been shown 
to improve the outcomes of ARDS patients [32, 33]. 
Although noninvasive ventilation use was discouraged, 
it was used in 12 patients. The WHO considers noninva-
sive ventilation an option in selected MERS cases [15]. It 
should be used as a short trial without delaying intuba-
tion if unsuccessful [15]. Moreover, high-flow oxygen by 
nasal cannula may be another option [15, 34]; however, 
the associated transmission risk as a result of aerosol 
generation is unknown. Systematic corticosteroids, riba-
virin and interferon were avoided as they have no proven 
benefit [15, 35]. Our MERS patients had high mortal-
ity (63  %). The previously reported mortality of MERS 
patients who had critical illness ranged from 58 to 84 % 
[2, 3, 18]. None of our HCWs who developed MERS died, 
which was gratifying to our staff.
Conclusions
Our MERS-CoV hospital outbreak stressed our system 
to unprecedented limits. We learned many lessons from 
it (Table  4). The successful management of outbreak 
required integrating ICU functions with the hospital-
wide plans, having preparedness plans, implementing 
proper infection control practices and managing staffing 
and staff exposure.
Table 4 Lessons learned from the MERS-CoV outbreak
Every hospital should have an Infectious Disease Epidemic Plan that should govern the response to an infectious disease outbreak. The response 
should cover organizing patient services, implementing infection control, managing employee exposure and communicating with national 
health services and with hospital staff
Hospital leaders should be prepared to increase the capacity of negative‑pressure airborne infection isolation rooms in the case of an infectious 
disease outbreak
All healthcare workers should receive training on proper hand hygiene and personal protective equipment application. Hand hygiene and per‑
sonal protective equipment practices should be monitored. Education should be repeated periodically
All healthcare workers should be fit‑tested for N95 respirators on hire with the result documented in their files. Periodic audit of this requirement 
should be done
Hospitals should make plans to acutely increase personal protective equipment supplies as consumption increases tremendously during an infec‑
tious disease outbreak
Hospital and ICU leaders should have plans to cover healthcare workers who are exposed or become symptomatic to avoid potential staff short‑
age
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